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Abstract
We herein advance a contribution to the theoretical literature on nancial frictions and show
the signicance of the matching mechanism in explaining the countercyclical behavior of interest
rate spreads. We demonstrate that when matching friction is associated with a Nash bargaining
solution, it provides a satisfactory explanation of the credit spread cycle in response to shocks in
production technology or in the cost of banks resources. During periods of expansion, the credit
spread experiences a tightening for two reasons. Firstly, as a result of easier access to loans,
entrepreneurs have better opportunities outside a given lending relationship and can negotiate
lower interest rates. Secondly, the less selective behavior of entrepreneurs and banks results
in the occurrence of fewer productive matches, a fall in the average productivity of matches,
and a tightening of the credit spread. Our results also underline the amplication and propaga-
tion properties of matching friction, which represent a powerful nancial accelerator mechanism.
Keywords: Matching Friction, Credit Market Imperfections, Credit Spread, Business Cycle.
JEL Classication: C78 ; E32 ; E44 ; G21
University Paris-Dauphine, LEDA-SDFi. Email: kevin.beaubrun@dauphine.fr.
yUniversity of Nantes, LEMNA. Email: fabien.tripier@univ-nantes.fr.
1
1 Introduction
The credit spread cycle may be thought of as the result of the e¤ect of the business cycle on the
di¤erence between lending rates and risk-free rates, and is of fundamental importance in nance
and macroeconomics. The variations in interest rate spreads that occur during the business cycle are
commonly viewed as being the consequence of nancial frictions. Through the mechanism of nancial
acceleration, nancial imperfections are well-known for creating1 specic transmission channels for
monetary policy and for amplifying the magnitude and persistence of any uctuations in the business
cycle. Despite a large consensus regarding the empirical robustness of the countercyclical behavior of
interest rate spreads2, some disagreement still exists about the underlying theoretical mechanisms.
This article contributes to the literature on nancial frictions and shows the signicance of
the matching mechanism in the credit spread cycle. We demonstrate how matching friction, when
associated with a Nash bargaining solution, explain the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread.
This original approach is distinct from previous contributions on the credit spread cycle, which were
mainly conducted within the agency paradigm. We herein extend the matching models of the credit
market to the prediction of the credit spread cycle.
In previous literature, asymmetry in the ow of information between lenders and borrowers
induces an inverse relationship between the borrowers net worth and the relative cost of external
nance, usually measured as the spread between the rate of return on the rms capital and a
risk-free rate3. Ever since Gomes et al. (2003) showed that models such as those of Carlstrom
1This view has been put forward most notably in the inuential series of contributions of Bernanke (1983), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989) and Bernanke et al. (1996, 1999).
2This fact may be observed by inspecting various data on business cycles and interest rates. Gomes et al. (2003)
report lead and lag correlations between two macroeconomic variables (the Total Factor Productivity and the ratio of
investment to capital) and two interest rate spreads (the yield spread between Baa and Aaa rated corporate bonds and
the spread between prime bank loan and a 3-month commercial paper). Guha and Hiris (2002) and Koopman and Lucas
(2005) study the cyclical behavior of the spread between the yields on Baa corporate bonds and on government bonds
for long periods. In their analysis, Dueker and Thornton (1997) propose an interpretation of the bank interest rate
margin as being a bank markup. This contribution is particularly interesting because it investigates the countercyclical
behavior of bank markup due to market imperfections.
3This spread is commonly called the external nance premium.
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and Fuerst (1997) exhibit a procyclical cost of external nance, several attempts to improve the
agency model in this regard have been proposed. Faia and Monacelli (2007) modied the stochastic
structure of the shocks in the Carlstrom-Fuerst model in order to shift the sign of the cost of external
nance in response to a technological shock. Meeks (2006) preserves the Carlstrom-Fuerst model,
but extends the sources of the uctuations and shows that nancial shocks can explain the observed
negative correlation between output and the cost of external nance. Walentin (2005) highlighted
the signicance of the specic assumptions made by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) in explaining its
undesirable attributes, namely that a procyclical cost of external nance comes from the absence
of a link between capital prices and the self-nancing ratio of entrepreneurs. He suggests using the
Bernanke et al. (1999) model, which encompasses such a link, and thus generates a countercyclical
cost of external nance.
There is an important di¤erence between the credit spread, which is the subject of this paper,
and the external nance premium, which is usually studied in the agency-based literature4. Levin
et al. (2004) make the distinction between the two wedges in the well-known model of Bernanke
et al. (1999) rather more explicit. The agency-based literature focuses on the external nance
premium of physical capital, because the physical capital stock of the borrower forms the collateral
in the borrowing relationship. In this literature, the cyclical variation of interest rate spreads results
from cyclical variations in the net worth of the borrowers. In our model, unlike those found in
the agency-based literature, nancial frictions result from the matching process of borrowers and
lenders in the credit market. The borrowers net worth does not inuence the nancial friction
mechanism. We herein focus on the cyclical variations of the credit spread5 showing that it is
linked with cyclical variations in the borrowers nancing opportunities on the credit market, and
4It is worth mentioning that even if the agency-based models do mainly focus on the external nance premium, the
recent contributions of Goodfriend and McCallum (2007), De Fiore and Tristani (2009), and Curdia and Woodford
(2009) highlight the importance of the cyclical behavior of the credit spread in monetary policy analysis.
5The concept of the credit spread is also important since it is widely used to obtain an empirical measure of the
external nance premium, which has no direct empirical counterpart, as explained by de Graeve (2009).
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the reservation productivity of the matches determined by borrowers and lenders.
In departing from the traditional agency-based literature, we reect a growing interest in the
ability of the matching model to explain the consequences of imperfections in the credit market.
DellAriccia and Garibaldi (2005) and Craig and Haubrich (2006) constructed databases of credit
ows and showed that the credit market in the United States is characterized by large and cyclical
ows of credit expansions and contractions that may be explained in terms of matching friction.
Den Haan et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) developed theoretical models to describe the
powerful amplication and propagation mechanisms associated with matching friction6. However,
these contributions are not concerned with the implications of matching friction on the cyclical
behavior of credit spread. It is worth mentioning that in the model of Den Haan et al. (2003), the
loan contract is still based on agency costs and not on a Nash bargaining solution. In this regard,
our model is close to that of Wasmer and Weil (2004), who also consider a Nash bargaining solution.
The authors emphasize the structural determinants of the credit spread in a double matching process
with credit and labor markets, but do not question the business cycle behavior of the credit spread.
In order to address the questions outlined above, we have developed a model that incorporates
three separate approaches, as follows. (i) An aggregate matching technique identies the search-and-
meet processes taking place in the credit market and then determines the ow of new matches as a
function of the mass of unmatched entrepreneurs and the searching intensity of the banks. (ii) The
nancial contract determines the credit interest rate as an outcome of a Nash bargaining solution
that takes place between banks and entrepreneurs. (iii) The rule of match destruction, which is the
consequence of negative idiosyncratic shocks on the entrepreneurs technology production. In our
contribution, the Nash bargaining solution plays a critical role in allowing the endogenous dynamics
of the credit spread that occur as a result of technological shocks.
6See Besci et al. (2005) and Nicolleti and Pierrard (2006) for more recent research on matching friction in the
credit market.
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We show that the response to technological shocks is governed by a combination of the three
di¤erent e¤ects described below.
1. The rst e¤ect of technological shocks on the surplus causes a procyclical credit spread. Banks
and entrepreneurs bargain to share the value of the match, which depends on the prots
yielded by the production activity and the opportunity cost of the match. Banks obtain a
share (precisely equal to their bargaining power) of this value paid by the entrepreneur via
the loan interest rate. A positive technological shock increases the prots from the production
activity and from the loan interest rate. Since the cost of the banks resources are independent
of the technological shock, an increase in the loan interest rate widens the credit spread. The
two other e¤ects act in the opposite sense and lead to a countercyclical credit spread.
2. The second e¤ect is also related to the banks appropriation of production revenues via the
Nash bargaining solution. Following a positive technological shock, the average idiosyncratic
productivity of matches decreases7. Given the higher e¢ciency of the aggregate technological
productivity, banks and entrepreneurs are less selective and accept matches that have a lower
idiosyncratic productivity. The fall in the average idiosyncratic productivity of the matches
reduces the prots from the production activity and consequently decreases the loan interest
rate. As a result of this downward adjustment of the productivity reservation, the credit spread
reacts negatively to positive technological shock.
3. The third e¤ect is a result of modications to the external opportunities of entrepreneurs. For
each agent, the ease of nding another partner determines its threat point and thus its revenues
raised as a result of the bargaining process. A positive technological shock increases the average
value of its matches, and stimulates the supply of loans to be matched on the credit market.
This implies a shorter average delay in entrepreneurs nding loans, and reinforces their threat
7The average productivity of matches is dened as the product of the exogenous technological shock and the average
idiosyncratic productivity of the matches.
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point in the bargaining process. Since an entrepreneur could nd easily an another loan if the
bargaining process were to fail, a lower interest rate on the loan may be obtained.
We conduct a numerical analysis to assess the relative importance of these three e¤ects. We
conclude that the second and third e¤ects dominate the rst, leading to a countercyclical credit
spread in the economy. We extend the scope of the model beyond the analysis of the technological
shock to that of an additional shock, taking into account an unanticipated exogenous movement in
the short-term interest rate. Our results illustrate the countercyclical dynamic of the credit spread
induced by the interest rate shock. This results from the adjustments made to the productivity
reservation and the external opportunities of the entrepreneurs. Finally, we document how the
underlying mechanism amplies and propagates the e¤ects of the shocks. We demonstrate that
both shocks are amplied and propagated in a similar way during ve consecutive quarters, which is
synonymous with a powerful nancial accelerator e¤ect.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The model is described in section 2. The
equilibrium of the model is dened and studied analytically in Section 3. The results of numerical
analysis of the models predictions for the business cycle are described in section 4. The extension to
interest rate shocks, and a discussion of the nancial accelerator mechanism are provided in section
5. Some conclusions are given in Section 6.
2 The Model
Banks have funds, but no projects. Entrepreneurs have projects, but no funds. Both banks and
entrepreneurs therefore search for partners in the credit market. As a result of the phenomenon of
search friction, nding a partner on the credit market is rather time-consuming. When matched,
banks and entrepreneurs can decide whether to maintain the match or not, depending on the pro-
ductivity of the funded activity (the project). If they decide to continue with the agreement, they
6
then carry out a bargaining process to agree the loan rate.
2.1 Credit Market and Matching Frictions
Let us dene Et as the population of entrepreneurs growing at an exogenous and deterministic rate
ge: If Nt is the number of entrepreneurs that are matched with banks, it follows that the number of
unmatched entrepreneurs is given by (Et  Nt). The ow of new matches Mt is a function of the
numbers of unmatched entrepreneurs, (Et  Nt), and the banks loan supply, Vt. The search friction
may be summarized by
Mt = m (Vt; Et  Nt) (1)
The function m (; ) increases with both arguments and is strictly concave with constant return
to scale. The function satises m (Vt; Et  Nt) < min fVt; Et  Ntg. From the point of view of
a bank, the matching probability is given by qt = Mt=Vt. For entrepreneurs, the probability is
pt = Mt= (Et  Nt). Given the assumption of constant return to scale, matching probabilities satisfy
the following properties
qt = q (t) = m

1;
1
t

=
m (t; 1)
t
=
p (t)
t
=
pt
t
(2)
where t = Vt= (Et  Nt) is the tightness credit market variable. Using a standard Cobb-Douglas
matching function, the matching probability for entrepreneurs may be written as
pt = m

t (3)
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where 0 < m < 1 is the scale parameter and 0 <  < 1 is the elasticity parameter of the matching
function. The rate of matched entrepreneurs, nt = Nt=Et; evolves according to
nt+1 (1 + ge) = (1  st+1) [nt +m (vt; 1  nt)] (4)
where st is the endogenous rate of separation per period. The separation rate concerns both the old
matches, nt; and the new matches, mt.
2.2 The Financial Contract
2.2.1 Reservation Productivity for Entrepreneurs and Banks
Entrepreneurs produce yt units of nal good (the numeraire) with the quantity i of nal good as
input according to the following constant return to scale terminology
yt (i;!) = zt!i (5)
where zt is the aggregate productivity level, ! the idiosyncratic productivity level, and i the quantity
of input. At each date, all entrepreneurs pick a new value for ! from the uniform distribution function
G (!) that satises
dG (!) =d! = 1= (!   !) ;with ! > ! (6)
We denote Jt (!), the entrepreneurs value function of being matched with an idiosyncratic produc-
tivity level !. If the entrepreneur accepts the match, he gets the value function Jat (!), otherwise he
turns to the credit market and gets the value function V et : Then, the value function Jt (!) writes
Jt (!) = max fJ
a
t (!) ; V
e
t g (7)
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In the remainder, the reservation productivity level e!et satises the condition Jat (e!et ) = V et ; with
max fJat (!) ; V
e
t g =
8><>:
Jat (!) ; !  e!et
V et ; ! < e!et (8)
For banks the value function, t (!), depends also on the idiosyncratic productivity of the
entrepreneurs technology, !; which is perfectly observed by banks unlike in agency-based models.
According to the realized value of !, a bank decides either to accept the match, and obtains the
value function at (!), or to refuse it, and gets V
b
t
t (!) = max

at (!) ; V
b
t
	
(9)
For banks, the reservation productivity level e!bt satises the condition at e!bt = V bt ; with
max

at (!) ; V
b
t
	
=
8><>:
at (!t) ; !  e!bt
V bt ; ! < e!bt (10)
Depending on the productivity of the project, matched banks and entrepreneurs will decide
either to pursue or to sever the credit relationship. If they choose to maintain their cooperation, they
will negotiate a nancial contract in which a credit interest rate will be determined.
2.2.2 The Nash Bargaining Solution
The nancial contract determines the credit interest rate, R`t (!), as a function of !; the idiosyncratic
productivity of the entrepreneurs technology. The interest rate is the outcome of a Nash bargaining
solution, where  is the bargaining power of the entrepreneur and (1  ) represents the banks
9
bargaining power. Use of the Nash bargaining solution leads to the traditional sharing rule

 
at (!)  V
b
t

= (1  ) (Jat (!)  V
e
t ) (11)
2.2.3 The Separation Rule
The outcome of the bargaining process ensures equality between the reservation productivity of the
bank and that of the entrepreneur: e!t = e!et = e!bt . Indeed, the sharing rule (11) implies that
Jat (!)  V
e
t =

1  
 
at (!)  V
b
t

(12)
Equation (12) states that, for any !, if the bank wants to pursue the relationship given by at (!) 
V bt , the implication is that the entrepreneur will also want to stay matched, J
a
t (!) > V
e
t . The
reservation productivity threshold must satisfy
Jat (e!t)  V et = 1    at (e!t)  V bt  = 0: (13)
The endogenous separation rate, which is an increasing function of e!t, is computed given the uniform
distribution of !
st =
Z
e!t
!
dG (!) =
e!t   !
!   !
(14)
2.3 Value Functions
2.3.1 Entrepreneurs
We assume that entrepreneurs have no personal wealth (internal fund) and borrow a constant amount.
In other words, all entrepreneurs borrow the same amount ` = i to produce. The value functions
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Jat (!) and V
e
t are dened as follows
Jat (!) = zt!`  ` R
`
t (!) `  x
e + Et
Z !
!
Jt+1 (!) dGt+1 (!)

(15)
V et = ptEt
Z !
!
Jt+1 (!) dGt+1 (!)

+ (1  pt) Et

V et+1
	
(16)
where  is the discount rate, zt! represent sales, ` is the cost of input, R
`
t (!) ` is the cost of the
credit using R`t (!) as the credit interest rate, and x
e represents the xed costs of production8. The
probability that an entrepreneur does not nd a bank is given by (1  pt) , in which case he must
turn to the credit market in the next period. It should be noted that being matched with a bank
does not necessarily ensure that the entrepreneur is awarded funds for his project. The decision to
nance the project depends on the realized value of !.
In order to solve the bargaining process, we compute the net surplus of being matched from an
entrepreneurs perspective
Jat (!)  V
e
t = zt!` 
 
1 +R`t (!)

`  xe (17)
+(1  pt) Et
Z !
!

Jt+1 (!)  V
e
t+1

dGt+1 (!)

Equation (17) states that an entrepreneurs net surplus is the sum of the revenue per period (to-
tal sales less production and credit costs) plus the expected value of the net surplus in the next
period. The entrepreneur gets the net surplus at the new period with a probability of 1 if matched
and pt if unmatched. Here, the term (1  pt) represents the di¤erence between the matching proba-
bilities of the two states.
8We introduce xed costs of production to ensure the existence of a positive value for the productivity reservatione!.
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2.3.2 Banks
The value functions at (!) and V
b
t are dened as follows
at (!) = R
`
t (!) ` R
h
t `  x
b + Et
Z !
!
t+1 (!) dG (!)

(18)
V bt =  d+ qtEt
Z !
!
t+1 (!) dG (!)

+ (1  qt) Et

V bt+1
	
(19)
where R`t (!) ` denotes the revenue generated by the credit activity, R
h
t ` represents the cost of the
resources, xb is the xed cost of managing the project, d represents the per cost of the search per
period, and qt is the matching probability for a bank. When matched to an entrepreneur, the net
surplus of a bank is
at (!)  V
b
t = R
`
t (!) ` R
h
t `  x
b + d (20)
+(1  qt) Et
Z !
!

t+1 (!)  V
b
t+1
	
dG (!)

Equation (20) states that a banks net surplus is the sum of the revenue per period (the credit
interests, less the costs of ressources and of project management, plus the search cost unpaid when
matched) plus the expected value of the net surplus in the next period. The bank gets the net surplus
at the new period with a probability of 1 if matched and qt if unmatched. Here, the term (1  qt)
represents the di¤erence between the matching probabilities of the two states.
2.4 Equilibrium Decisions for the Loan Interest Rate, Separation, and
Entry
We assume that the costs of searches in the credit market are borne completely by the banks and
that all unmatched entrepreneurs search for funds on the credit market. The endogenous entry of
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banks determines the tightness of the credit market. The free entry condition on the credit market
implies that V bt = 0. From (19), we deduce that
d
qt
= Et
Z !
!
t+1 (!) dG (!)

= Et
(Z !
e!bt+1
at+1 (!) dG (!)
)
(21)
since Et

V bt+1
	
= 0: The banks surplus (20) then becomes
at (!)  V
b
t =
 
R`t (!) R
h
t

`  xb +
d
qt
: (22)
In equation (22), the new variable is the d=qt, which represents the current average cost of a match.
From (21), this equals the expected value of a match for the next period.
The equilibrium credit interest rate is deduced from (12), (17) and (22)
R`t (!) ` = (1  ) [zt!`  (`+ x
e)] + 

xb +Rht `  pt
d
qt

(23)
R`t (!) ` represents the banks revenues, which is equal to the product of the interest rate, R
`
t (!),
and the amount of the credit, `. The equilibrium value of these revenues is an average of two terms
weighted according to the bargaining powers represented by (1  ) and . The rst term is the net
production prot, dened as the amount of total output, zt!`, minus the total cost, (`+ x
e). The
second term represents the xed cost for the bank, xb, plus the cost of the resources, Rht `, minus
the entrepreneurs outside opportunity, ptd=qt. An increase in the credit market tightness (namely
t = pt=qt) improves the outside opportunity of entrepreneurs, thus diminishing the banks payo¤ .
The separation rule is deduced from equations (13) and (22)
R`t (e!t) `+ dqt = Rht `+ xb (24)
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The term on the LHS is the value of a match for a bank, dened as the sum of the credit activity
revenues, R`t (e!t) `, and the expected value of a match at the next period, d=qt. A bank would
maintain a match if, and only if, its value is at least higher than the cost of the match (the term on
the RHS), equal to the cost of the loan, Rht `, plus the cost of managing the project, x
b.
Given the equilibrium interest rate from (23), the separation rule (24) may then be written as
(zte!t   1) `  xe + 1  pt
1  

d
qt
= Rht `+ x
b (25)
and the free entry condition (21) is
d
qt
= Et
Z !
e!t+1
 
R`t+1 (!) R
h
t+1

`  xbt+1 +
d
qt+1

dG (!)

(26)
The free entry condition implies that banks enter the credit market (bearing a cost d with a probability
qt to nd a partner), and remain there until the current expected cost of matching equals the present
value of the anticipated banks surplus for the matches concerned.
2.5 Aggregate Variables
We restrict our attention to three aggregate variables, namely Rpt , the average credit spread, Yt, the
total output, and, Lt, the total credit in the economy. This last variable is obtained by multiplying
the number of nanced entrepreneurs, nt, by the value of each individual loan
Lt = nt` (27)
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The total output is the product of the number of nanced entrepreneurs, nt, the aggregate produc-
tivity level, zt, the value of each loan, `, and the average productivity of the entrepreneurs
9
Yt = nt`zt

! + e!t
2

: (28)
We dene the credit spread as the di¤erence between the credit interest rate, R`t (!), and the
cost of resources for the bank, Rht . To account for the heterogeneity of the matches, the credit spread
is dened as the average of the individual spreads10
Rpt = (1  )

zt
(! + e!t)
2`
 
xe
`
 
 
1 +Rht

+ 

xb   dt
`

(29)
Equation (29) is a weighted average of two terms that has coe¢cients representing the agents bar-
gaining powers (1  ) and . For  = 1, which corresponds to the extreme case of an absence of
bargaining power for a bank, the credit spread depends on two variables, namely the banks cost,
xb, and the credit market tightness, t. In the opposite case where  = 0, entrepreneurs have no
bargaining power and banks earn all the surplus from the production process.
3 Theoretical Properties
In this section, we rstly characterize the equilibrium state of the model, and then describe the credit
market cycle.
9The expression is derived from Yt = ntzt`
R !t
e!t
!dH (!) where H (!) is the distribution function of ! for the
matched entrepreneurs (who have ! above e!t; the productivity of reservation). This function satises dH (!) =d (!) =
1= (!   e!t).
10This equation is deduced by introducing into Rpt =
R !
e!t

R`t (!) R
h
t

dH (!) the expression of R`t (!) given by
(23).
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3.1 Denition, Existence, and Stability of the equilibrium
We rstly dene full equilibrium, and then its reduced form. The reduced form yields the conditions
of existence, uniqueness, and stability of the equilibrium. In the following section, the xed amount
of the loan is normalized to unity ` = 1, without loss of generality. We also consider a xed value
for the interest rate Rht = R
h . Shocks to this variable are introduced in Section 5.1.
Denition 1 The equilibrium case is given by the set of endogenous variables fYt,Lt,R
p
t ,nt,st,pt,qt,t,e!t,ztg
that satises: (i) the denitions of aggregate variables for output Yt (28), credit Lt (27), and the credit
spread Rpt (29); (ii) the law of motion of matched entrepreneurs nt (4) given the rates of matching pt
(2) and qt (3), and the rate of separation st (14); (iii) the equilibrium conditions for credit market
tightness t (26) and for the productivity reservation e!t (25); and (iv) the following process for the
exogenous and stochastic variable zt
log (zt+1) = z log (zt) + (1  z) log (z) + "z;t+1 (30)
where z is the steady-state value of zt, z is the persistence parameter, and "z  iid (0; 
2
z) is the in-
novation with variance 2z. The set of structural parameters is  =

Rh; xe; xb;m; ; ; ; d; z; z; z
	
.
In order to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, we reduce the equilibrium
to a four-dimensional system for the variables ft; e!t; Rpt ; ztg. To this end, we reformulate the free
entry condition and separation rule according to the following denition.
Denition 2 The reduced model is a set of endogenous variables ft; e!t; Rpt ; ztg that satisfy four
equations, given the set of structural parameters  dened in Denition 1. Using the interest rate
denition (23), the matching probability (2), and the separation rule (25), the rst equation for the
16
free entry condition (26) becomes
d
m
1 t =
(1  )
2 (!   !)
Et

zt+1 (!   e!t+1)2	 (31)
The equilibrium value of the credit market tightness t depends on the expected values for the tech-
nological shock, Et fzt+1g ; and the productivity reservation, Et fe!t+1g. The second equation for the
separation rule (25) becomes
zte!t` = xb + xe +  1 +Rh  1  mt
1  

d
m
1 t (32)
using the equations for the rates of matching given in (2) and (3). The equilibrium value for the
productivity reservation e!t depends on the current values of the technological shock, zt, and the credit
market tightness, t. The third equation is (29), which gives the equilibrium value of the credit spread
as a function of the credit market tightness, t; the reservation productivity, !t; and the technological
shock, zt. The fourth, equation is the law of motion of the aggregate technology zt (30).
The following proposition establishes the existence and uniqueness conditions of the reduced
equilibrium.
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium f; e!; Rp; zg of the reduced model dened in Denition
2 exists and is unique, if the following condition is satised
xb + xe +
 
1 +Rh

z
< ! <
xb + xe +
 
1 +Rh

z
(33)
+

(1  ) zm
d
=(1 )
m


2
1=(1 )
+

2  
2


in which an additional parameter has been introduced:  = !   !. This condition is necessary and
su¢cient.
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See Appendix A.1.
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium condition, we now turn
to the short-run properties of the model. In order to study the short-run properties, the model is
log-linearized around its unique steady-state. In the following section, we dene the log-deviation of
the variable x, denoted bx, as bx = log (xt=x) ; for x = ; e!;Rp; and z.
Denition 3 The log-linearized version of the reduced model in Denition 2 is
(1  )bt = Etbzt+1   2 e!
!   e! be!t+1

(34)
ze!be!t =   1
m
   

1  

(1  ) dbt   ze!bzt (35)
RpcRpt = (1  )! + e!2

zbzt + (1  ) z
2
be!t   dbt (36)
bzt = bzt 1 + "t (37)
We denote xz as the elasticity of the endogenous variable xt to the shock zt that satises bxt = xz bzt
for x = ; e!; and Rp. The elasticities of ft; e!t; Rpt g are
z =


1  

! + e!
!   e!

1 
2d
z (!   e!)

1
m
 

1  



 1
(38)
e!z =   1
m
 

1  

(1  ) d
ze! z   1 (39)
RpRpz = (1  )

! + e!
2

z + (1  )
e!
2
ze!z   dz (40)
See Appendix A.2 for the detailed calculations.
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In the following proposition, we state the stability condition of the log-linearized equilibrium,
before interpreting the coe¢cients in Section 3.2.
Proposition 2 The log-linear equilibrium of
nbt; be!t;cRpt; bzto dened by equations (34)-(35)-(36)-
(37) is stable if the following condition holds
 2dz (!   e!)

1
m
 

1  
 < 1 (41)
This condition is su¢cient.
See Appendix A.2 .
3.2 The Credit Market Cycle
In this section, we discuss the theoretical properties of the credit market cycle. This discussion is
restricted to the endogenous variables of the reduced model dened in Denition 2. The dynamic
properties of other variables, such as the output and the total credit, are studied using model simu-
lations in Section 4.2.1.
Proposition 3 The elasticity of the credit market tightness to technological shock is positive: z > 0.
The sign of the elasticity of the productivity reservation to the technological shock is ambiguous. A
su¢cient (and not necessary) condition for e!z < 0 is
  (1  ) (42)
The sign of the elasticity of the credit spread to technological shock is ambiguous. The credit spread
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reacts negatively to the shock (Rpz < 0) if
(1  )

! + e!
2

z < dz + (1  )
e!
2
z ( e!z) (43)
This condition is necessary and su¢cient.
See Appendix A.2.
Comments on the condition (42). We hereafter assume condition (42) holds. We will check
the robustness of our results against this condition using numerical analysis. It is worth mentioning
that this condition can be related to the famous condition of Hosios (1990) used in models with
matching friction. This condition states that the trading externalities induced by matching friction
are e¢ciently internalized by the Nash bargaining solution, provided that the bargaining powers of
the agents are equal to their marginal contribution to the matching process  see also Pissarides
(2000). In our setup, the Hosios (1990) condition implies  = 1   . This condition is then more
restrictive than the condition (42) imposed in Proposition 3.
3.2.1 Credit Market Tightness
We may describe the full e¤ect of technological shock on credit market tightness using three terms.
In order to characterize explicitly the e¤ects of technological shock zt on credit market tightness t,
we introduce Equation (35) into (34) and obtain
(1  )bt = Etbzt+1 + 2e!
!   e!bzt+1 +

1
m
   

1  

2 (1  ) d
(!   e!) z bt+1

(44)
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Given bt = zbzt and Et fbzt+1g = bzt; the three identiable terms are
z =

1  | {z } +
2e!
!   e! 1  | {z }+

1
m
   

1  

2d
(!   e!) z z| {z }
First term Second term Third term
(45)
The value z given in Equation (38) is the solution of Equation (45).
The rst term is positive and equal to (=1  ) in Equation (38). Its magnitude depends
on the persistence parameter, ; and the elasticity parameter of the matching function, (1  ),
introduced in Equations (30) and (3), respectively. The more persistent the shock, the higher the
impact of zt on t. This property results from the forward-looking characteristic of the tightness of
the credit market  see Equation (31). The current entry of banks into the credit market is driven
by the expectation of future revenues that may be earned if matching occurs. In the extreme case
of an absence of persistence,  = 0, since future revenues are independent of the current technology,
the coe¢cient, z, is null and the tightness of the credit market does not respond to technological
shocks11.
With regard to the second (elasticity) parameter, the higher the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to the mass of unmatched entrepreneurs, denoted (1  ), the lower the im-
pact of the shock on the tightness of the credit market. In order to gain further insight into this
relationship, by inspection of Equation (31) it may be seen that (1  ) may also be interpreted as
the elasticity of the equilibrium duration of a vacant position for a bank with respect to the tightness
of the credit market (i.e. 1=q = 1 =m). In response to the expectation of future revenues that may
be associated with a positive shock, banks accept a longer average duration of vacant positions (1=q
rises). In order to achieve an increase in 1=q ,  must rise with an amplitude that depends on (1  ).
For values of  close to unity, the average duration of vacant positions shows a slight sensitivity to
11If the shocks are not persistent, any improvement of technology does not last and cannot therefore stimulate the
entry of banks into the credit market.
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. Consequently, large variations of  are required in response to technological shocks (z is high,
indeed lim!1 z =1). At the other extreme, for  close to zero, small variations of  are su¢cient
in response to technological shocks and the tightness of the credit market is less sensitive to these
shocks (z is low, for  = 0).
The second and third terms are the consequence of the negative response of the productivity
reservation e!t to technological shocks. The expected productivity reservation for the next period
has a negative inuence in the equation of the free entry condition that determines the current
tightness of the credit market  see Equation (34). A high value of e!t implies a highly selective
process of matches, with a low probability of being matched on the credit market with a su¢ciently
productive entrepreneur12. Consequently, banks are less willing to enter the credit market, since
total matching costs are higher, and the tightness of the credit market t falls. As explained below,
productivity reservation responds negatively to technological shocks. The second term in Equation
(45) corresponds to the current impact of the expected variation of the productivity reservation on
the tightness of the credit market. The coe¢cient (=1  )  [(! + e!) = (!   e!)] > 1 in Equation
(38) corresponds to a combination of the rst and second terms.
The third and nal term identied in Equation (45) corresponds to the nal term in brackets of
Equation (38). In response to a positive technological shock, given a future increase in t+1 induced
by a decrease in !t+1, there is a smaller current increase in t. Given the stability condition (41), the
sign of the third term in Equation (45) is strictly positive, but it can be either above or below unity.
When greater than one, the third term reinforces the rst and second terms (thus increasing the
total e¤ect of shocks). Under condition (42), this term is less than unity. Hence, this e¤ect weakens
the full e¤ect of technological shocks. In order to understand this point, it must be remembered
that condition (42) implies that productivity reservation reacts negatively to a positive shock and
12A high value of e!t also implies a higher average idiosyncratic productivity of matches. This productivity e¤ect
could act in the opposite sense, by stimulating the supply of loans on the credit market. However, in our model this
productivity e¤ect is strictly dominated by the e¤ect of e!t on the probability of match acceptance described in the
text.
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depends inversely on the tightness of the credit market. In the intertemporal equation (34), this
means that a current positive shock increases the expected value of the tightness of the credit market
for the following period, which lowers the current response of the tightness of the credit market to
the shock. The response is weakened, but still positive.
3.2.2 Reservation Productivity
Equilibrium reservation productivity depends on technological shock via two mechanisms. The rst
follows from the perfect interchangeability of the aggregate productivity and the idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity. This e¤ect corresponds to the coe¢cient  1 in Equation (39). From the perspective of
banks and entrepreneurs, the aggregate productivity, z, and the idiosyncratic productivity, !, are
perfect substitutes for one another. Indeed, in the term on the LHS of Equation (32), which denes
the equilibrium rule of separation , the amount of the loan is multiplied by the product of the two
productivity variables (zt  e!t). This term denes the lower production level of a match that banks
and entrepreneurs can accept. If the term on the RHS of this equation is constant (which is the case
for z = 0), there is a one-to-one relation between zt and e!t. An increase of 1% in the aggregate
productivity induces a reduction of 1% in the productivity reservation in the economy.
The second mechanism by which technological shock a¤ects reservation productivity arises from
the response of the tightness of the credit market. This e¤ect is represented by the coe¢cient of z
in Equation (39). The sign of this coe¢cient is determined by condition (42). Condition (42) implies
that the reservation productivity depends inversely on the tightness of the credit market and the
sign of the coe¢cient of z in Equation (39) is negative. In fact, the tightness of the credit market
t inuences the reservation productivity e!t in two di¤erent ways - see Equation (32). The rst
arises from the free entry condition. Recalling that with free entry the expected value of a match for
banks is equal to the average cost of a match13: (d=m) 1 t , it follows that a high value of t means
13The average cost of a match is the per-period search cost, d, times the average duration of a vacant position for
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that the value of a match is high. In this case, banks and entrepreneurs are willing to accept lower
idiosyncratic productivity to preserve the match (e!t decreases with t). The second way results from
the bargaining process. For a xed value of match (equal to d=qt), the equation of the separation rule
(24) implies that the equilibrium revenues for the bank, given by (23), are constant. According to
Equation (23), as the tightness of the credit market increases, better external opportunities emerge
for entrepreneurs, which provokes a decline in the loan interest rate. Finally, high values of t make
banks more selective and the productivity reservation is also higher14.
Condition (42) implies that the rst way in which the tightness of the credit market inuences
the reservation productivity, strictly dominates the second. The elasticity e!z dened by (39) is then
negative and less than  1 (which is the value associated with the rst e¤ect only). The positive
response of the tightness of the credit market to a positive technological shock reinforces the rst
e¤ect of the shock on e!t. A positive technological shock increases the tightness of the credit market,
hence a higher expected value of a match leads banks and entrepreneurs to accept lower idiosyncratic
productivity values.
3.2.3 Credit Interest Spread
We now identify three distinct e¤ects of technological shocks on the credit spread, which correspond
to the coe¢cients of z; e!z, and z in Equation (40).
The rst two depend on the entrepreneurs prots in the production sector. Banks earn a
share (1  ) of the prots equal to the banks bargaining power in the Nash bargaining solution.
If they have no bargaining power ( = 1), the loan interest rate paid by the entrepreneurs covers
the costs of the banks15 and are independent of prots. The rst e¤ect of a positive technological
a bank, which is equal to the inverse of the bank matching probability 1=qt = (d=m) 
1 
t .
14This last e¤ect vanishes for  = 0, i.e. if entrepreneurs have no bargaining power.
15More precisely, the loan interests cover the xed costs of banking activity, denoted xb, minus the external oppor-
tunities of entrepreneurs, equal to dt. See Equation (29) with  = 1 and note that dt = pt  (d=qt), where pt is the
matching probabiliy of entrepreneurs and d=qt is the expected value of a match on the credit market.
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shock increases prots for the entrepreneur. For the same costs of production, prots grow with
technological improvement. This corresponds to the coe¢cient of z in Equation (40). The size of
this rst e¤ect depends on the banks bargaining power, and the average productivity of matches,
equal to (! + e!) z=2. The greater the bargaining power of the bank, the higher the impact of the
technological shock on the credit spread. In order to understand why the average productivity of
matches forms part of the expression for Rpz, it must be remembered that credit spread is an aggregate
variable. The impact of the shock on the production of a given match depends on the idiosyncratic
productivity of this match. Since the credit spread is an average of the individual credit interest rate
spreads in the economy, the impact of the shock depends on the average idiosyncratic productivity
of all the matches. This rst e¤ect leads to a procyclical credit spread.
The second e¤ect is based on the average productivity of matches, and acts in the opposite
sense to the rst e¤ect, generating a countercyclical credit spread. It corresponds to the coe¢cient
(1  ) ze! of e!z in (40). A fall in the productivity reservation e!t, in response to a positive shock,
diminishes the average productivity of matches as measured by credit spread see Equation (29)
again.
The third e¤ect is based on the threat point of entrepreneurs and, as for the second e¤ect,
acts to generate a countercyclical credit spread. This e¤ect corresponds to the coe¢cient d of
z in the expression of R
p
z given by (40). In order to better understand this, it should be noted
that d = p    (d=q). It may be observed that, with probability p, the entrepreneur can nd
another match and get a share  of the value of this match, equal to d=q as a result of the free entry
condition. Consequently, as the tightness of the credit market increases in response to a positive
shock, better external opportunities occur for entrepreneurs, which increase their threat point and
provoke a decline in the credit spread  see Equation (29).
In concluding this section on the credit spread, it is noted that in the extreme case of  =
1, banks have no bargaining power. In this case, the rst two e¤ects of a shock disappear. In
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consequence, the credit spread is necessarily countercyclical, given the third e¤ect (condition (43)
reduces to z > 0). In the general case of 0 <  < 1, if the second and third e¤ects are su¢ciently large
(i.e. having high values for z and  e!z) to verify condition (43), the credit spread is countercyclical,
since it reacts negatively to a positive productivity shock. We now turn to numerical simulations in
order to assess the plausibility of a countercyclical credit spread in this model.
4 Numerical Analysis
We use numerical analysis to clarify the cyclical properties of the credit spread, which are theoretically
ambiguous, in order to assess the robustness of our theoretical results to condition (42), and to
describe the dynamic behavior of other aggregate variables, such as the output and the total credit.
4.1 Calibration
The model is calibrated by choosing the available empirical counterparts for the interest rates and
the average rates of credit ows creation and destruction. Because the previous variables do not allow
us to calibrate all the structural parameters, we must make additional assumptions on the values of
these parameters. We restrict their range using the conditions of existence, uniqueness, and stability
of the equilibrium. A unit of time corresponds to a quarter.
The calibration constraints on interest rates are as follows16: the quarterly interest rate on
bank resources is Rh = 1:0201=4 and the quarterly interest rate on loans is R` = 1:0391=4. The rate of
16The interest rates are obtained using data generated by the Federal Reserve in their "Survey of terms of business
lending". Since our model is designed for business loans, and not for loans for household or real estate, we use
the series entitled "Commercial and Industrial Loan Rates Spreads over intended federal funds rate" (available on
the website http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/e2/e2chart.htm). Data are available only after 1986(3). For the
period before this, we generate the spread directly, as the di¤erence between the bank prime loan rate and the
e¤ective federal funds rate. Both these series are available from 1955 at monthly frequencies on the FRED website
(http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2 , Table H.15 Selected Interest Rates, series ID are MPRIME and FEDFUNDS
respectively). Data are converted to quarterly frequency by taking the average for each quarter. Finally, the sample
is 1955(1)-2008(4).
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creation and destruction of credit ows are taken from the database of commercial loan constructed
by DellAriccia and Garibaldi (2005) (see Table 3, p. 675). This implies a steady state for the rate
of credit destruction s = NEG = 0:0111; which corresponds to the variable NEG of DellAriccia
and Garibaldi (2005). The theoretical counterpart of the variable POS of DellAriccia and Garibaldi
(2005) is given by POS = [(1  s)m (v; 1  n) `] =L i.e. the ow of new credit matches divided
by the total loan in the economy. We impose POS = 0:0179 in the calibration procedure, and
assume that the matching probability of entrepreneurs is p = 0:417: The condition of Hosios (1990)
is imposed in the case of a symmetric Nash bargaining i.e.  =  = 0:5. The scale parameters of
the production and matching technologies are set as follows: ! = 0:95; ! = 1; z = 4; and m = :01.
Finally, the discount rate is set to a conventional value  = 0:999.
We then deduce from steady-state restrictions the values18 of g; e!; ; q; xe; xb; n; Y; and L. In
the following section, we provide a discussion of the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions.
Before that, we describe the business cycle behavior of the model for this calibration.
4.2 The Cyclical Behavior of the Credit Spread
The previous theoretical analysis emphasizes the interactions between several mechanisms that de-
termines the behavior of the business cycle of the credit spread, which have a number of distinct
implications. Some of the e¤ects of technological shock induce a procyclical credit spread dynamic,
while in contrast others lead to a countercyclical credit spread. In what follows, we perform numeri-
cal exercises to assess and to quantify the relative importance of these mechanisms according to the
values of the structural parameters used.
17On average, it takes 2.5 quarters for an entrepreneur to be nanced.
18The values are e! = 0:9506;  = 0:65; xe = 1:871; xb = 0:004; n = 0:493; Y = 1:923; L = 0:493; g = 0:006; and
d = 0:031:
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4.2.1 IRFs
Figure 1 depicts the impulse response functions (IRFs) to a positive technological shock of the output,
the credit spread, the credit market tightness, the reservation productivity, the total credit, and the
average productivity of matches.
A positive technological shock leads to an expansion of the credit in the economy by two means.
Firstly, the improvement of the aggregate technology leads banks and entrepreneurs to accept a lower
idiosyncratic productivity level. Since our calibration respects condition (42), the elasticity coe¢cient
!z is negative and the IRF of e!t is negative. This fall in reservation productivity decreases the rate
of match destruction in the economy and leads to a credit expansion. Secondly, the improvement
in aggregate technology stimulates the entry of banks into the credit market. In Proposition 3, we
showed that the elasticity z > 0, and thus the IRF of t is positive. This rise in credit market
tightness facilitates the nancing of entrepreneurs by increasing their matching probability, and thus
contributes to a credit expansion.
The IRFs of the credit market tightness and the productivity reservation return monotonically
to zero as the shock disappears. However, they induce a radically di¤erent pattern for the IRFs of
the total credit. In our economy, the short-run behavior of the total credit replicates the behavior of
the matching rate of entrepreneurs19, as dened by equation (4). The total credit variable adjusts
rather gradually, because it takes time for banks to nd new entrepreneurs on the credit market. The
IRF of the total credit depicted in Figure 1 is indeed hump-shaped with growing values during the
rst two years after the shock. The hump-shaped response of the total credit is very similar to the
output behavior, even though the denitions of the two variables di¤er substantially  see Equations
(27) and (28). The di¤erence between output and total credit is the average productivity of matches,
denoted !t
20. In Figure 1, we plot the IRFs of the average productivity of matches. The response
19It would be di¤erent with a variable amount of loan per match or for an endogenous arrival of entrepreneurs.
20More precisely, Yt = Lt  !

t where Yt is the output, Lt = nt` is the total loan variable, and !

t = zt (! + e!t) =2
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is negative and very close to zero. The weak response of this variable explains the high similarity
of the IRFs of output and total loan. The sign of the response signies that the negative values
for the average idiosyncratic productivity of matches outweighs the positive values for the aggregate
technological shock21. To conclude this section on the IRFs, we now turn to the dynamics of the
credit spread .
The credit spread reacts negatively to positive technological shocks, implying that Rpz < 0. For
all horizons, the sign of the IRF of the credit spread is opposite to that of the IRF of the output.
From this we conclude that this model generates a clear countercyclical credit spread. Since the rst
e¤ect of shocks induces a procyclical credit spread, it may be seen that the second and third e¤ects
described above dominate the rst. To conclude, for this calibration, matching friction on the credit
market supports countercyclical behavior in the credit spread.
4.2.2 Sensitive analysis
In order to assess the robustness of the previous results, we conduct a sensitivity analysis of the values
of the structural parameters. For each parameter, we use the conditions of existence, uniqueness,
and stability (33) and (41) to dene the range of admissible values. Given the lack of empirical
information for the matching rate of entrepreneurs, we also consider di¤erent steady-state values for
p. For each value of p, we again apply the entire calibration procedure described in section 4.1. We
simulate the model for values within this range and compute the correlation between output and
credit spread and between output and the average productivity of loans. Results are reported in
Figure 2 for the two key parameters  and  and for the variable p22.
The mechanism based on the market tightness is however su¢ciently strong to generate a coun-
is the average productivity of matches.
21The average idiosyncratic productivity of matches is (! + e!t) =2, which is compared with the aggregate techno-
logical shock zt.
22For parameters ; !; !, z; and m, the coe¢cients of correlation do not show signicative variations (the additional
gures are available upon request).
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tercyclical credit spread for all the values considered. The variations of the coe¢cient of correlation
between the credit spread and the output are very small for  and ; but sizeable for p: However,
even in the extreme case of p close to zero, the coe¢cient of correlation is still clearly negative (about
 0:60). Finally, it is worth mentioning that even if condition (42) does not hold for all simulations,
we do not observe shifts in the sign of the response e!t to technological shock. We then conclude that
our main results are robust to changes in the values of parameters.
5 Extension and Discussion
This nal section extends the model to the case of shocks in the short term interest rate, and discusses
the nancial accelerator properties of our model.
5.1 The Interest Rate Shock
We have hitherto only considered a unique source of uctuations, namely one of technological shock.
However, the literature on credit spread also focuses on interest rate shocks, specically those in-
volving unanticipated exogenous movement in the short term interest rate.
We rst dene the response of the reduced model to interest rate shocks and also describe its
log-linearized version.
Denition 4 The reduced model with interest rate shocks may be described using the set of endoge-
nous variables

t; e!t; Rpt ; Rht 	 that satisfy four equations, given the set of structural parameters 
dened in Denition 1. The rst equation is the free entry condition (26), which becomes
d
m
1 t =
(1  ) z
2 (!   !)
Et

(!   e!t+1)2	 (46)
using equations for the interest rate (23), the matching probability (2), the separation rule (25), and
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given the assumption zt = z. The equilibrium value of the credit market tightness t depends on the
expected values for the productivity reservation, Et fe!t+1g. The second equation is the separation rule
(25), which becomes
ze!t = xb + xe +  1 +Rht   1  mt1  

d
m
1 t (47)
using equations for the rates of matching (2) and (3) and given the assumption zt = z. The equi-
librium value for the productivity reservation e!t depends on the current values for the interest rate,
Rht , and for the credit market tightness, t. The third equation is (29), which becomes
Rpt = (1  )

z
(! + e!t)
2
  xe  
 
1 +Rht

+ 
 
xb   dt

(48)
given the assumption zt = z: The equilibrium value of the credit spread is a function of the credit
market tightness, t; the reservation productivity, !t; and the interest rate shock, R
h
t . The fourth,
and last, equation is the law of motion of the interest rate Rht
log
 
Rht+1

= Rh log
 
Rht

+ (1  Rh) log (z) + "Rh;t+1 (49)
where Rh is the steady-state value of Rht , Rh the persistence parameter and "Rh  iid
 
0; 2
Rh

the
innovation with variance 2
Rh
.
Condition (33) of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium still applies. The model is log-
linearized around its unique steady-state23.
Denition 5 The loglinearized reduced model dened in Denition 4 may be written as
(1  )bt = Et 2 e!
!   e! be!t+1

(50)
23The log-deviation of the variable x, denoted bx, is bx = log (xt=x) ; for x = ; e!;Rp; and Rh.
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ze!be!t = Rh bRht    1m    1  

(1  ) dbt (51)
RpcRpt =   (1  )Rh bRht + (1  ) z2be!t   dbt (52)
bRht = Rh bRht 1 + "Rh;t (53)
It may be assumed that xRh is the elasticity of the endogenous variable xt to the shock zt that satises
bxt = xRh  bRht for x = ; e!; and Rp. The elasticities of ft; e!t; Rpt g are
Rh =  

Rh
1  

2Rh
z (!   e!)

1 
2d=z
(!   e!)

1
m
 

1  

 1
(54)
ze!e!Rh = Rh    1m    1  

(1  ) dRh (55)
RpRp
Rh
=   (1  )Rh + (1  )
z
2
e!Rh   dRh (56)
The condition of equilibrium stability (41) dened in the model with technological shock still
applies with interest rate shocks.
5.1.1 The Interest Rate-driven Credit Market Cycle
The following proposition characterizes the credit market cycle induced by interest rate shocks.
Proposition 4 The elasticity of the tightness of the credit market to interest shock is negative,
Rh < 0. The sign of the elasticity of the productivity reservation to interest shock is ambiguous.
Condition (42) is su¢cient (but not necessary) to ensure e!Rh > 0. The credit spread reacts positively
to a positive shock (Rp
Rh
> 0) if
(1  )Rh < (1  )
z
2
e!Rh   dRh (57)
This is a necessary and su¢cient condition.
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See Appendix A.3.
In order to explain the e¤ects of interest rate shocks on the credit market, it is useful to
distinguish between several di¤erent e¤ects. The analysis of these e¤ects takes less times than for
technological shock, because the economic mechanisms operating here are similar to those presented
in Section 3.2.
Reservation Productivity. Interest rate shocks have two e¤ects on reservation productivity.
The rst e¤ect of the interest rate shock is positive and equal to Rh in the expression of e!Rh given
by (55). A positive interest shock increases the cost of resources for banks, and as a consequence it
decreases the prots arising from the match. In response to this higher cost, banks and entrepreneurs
become more selective, leading to an increase in reservation productivity e!.
The second e¤ect of interest rate shocks results from the adjustment of the tightness of the
credit market. Under condition (42), the coe¢cient of Rh, in the expression of e!Rh given by (55),
is negative. Given that Rh < 0 (as explained below), this implies that the second e¤ect of interest
rate shocks reinforces the rst by again increasing the reservation productivity. The decrease in the
tightness of the credit market lowers the value of a match24. In this context, banks and entrepreneurs
are less willing to accept matches with low idiosyncratic productivity to maintain the value of the
match. Consequently, the reservation productivity increases in response to positive interest rate
shocks.
Credit Market Tightness. Interest rate shocks do not directly a¤ect credit market tightness,
instead the relationship arises as a result of variations in reservation productivity. As shown in
(50), the current credit market tightness depends only (and negatively) on the expected value of
tomorrows reservation productivity. A high reservation productivity implies a high destruction rate
24If condition (42) does not hold, the indirect e¤ect could act in the opposite sense. See the comments on condition
(42) in section 3.2.
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of matches, which deters the entry of banks into the credit market. The interpretation of the rst
term of the expression of Rh in (54) is the same as in Section 3.2. The persistence parameter Rh
comes from the forward-looking characteristic of the credit market tightness, whose sensitivity to
changes in economic environment is determined by the parameter (1  ). The second term in (54),
2Rh= (z (!   e!)), is a consequence of the e¤ect of the shock on reservation productivity on credit
market tightness. This e¤ect is unambiguously positive because it induces a positive response in
reservation productivity following a positive interest shock. The third and last term in brackets in
Equation (54) corresponds to the response of the credit market tightness to tomorrows expected
interest rate shock. The condition of stability (41) implies that this term is positive.
Credit Interest Rate Spread. The sign of the elasticity Rp
Rh
dened by (56) is ambiguous,
because the e¤ect associated with Rh acts in the opposite sense to the two e¤ects associated with e!Rh
and Rh. These two last e¤ects result from the endogenous responses of the credit market tightness
and the productivity reservation. If these endogenous responses are su¢ciently large (entailing high
values for e!Rh and  Rh) to verify condition (57), the credit spread is countercyclical, since it reacts
positively to a positive interest rate shock.
The rst e¤ect of a positive interest shock on the credit spread is negative, and corresponds to
(1  )Rh in the elasticity Rp
Rh
dened in Equation (56). The credit spread falls, because the cost
of funds for the banks are taken into account in the bargaining process. The increase in Rh diminishes
the entrepreneurs prots and thus the loan interest paid to the bank. This e¤ect disappears for the
case of null bargaining power for the banks  = 1.
The second and third e¤ects of the interest rate shocks on the credit spread results from the
same mechanisms as for technological shocks. Indeed the coe¢cients of the elasticities e!Rh and Rh
in the expression of Rp
Rh
given by (56) are identical to the coe¢cients of the elasticities e!z and z
in the expression of Rpz given by (40). The di¤erence originates from the signs of these coe¢cients
and elasticities. Because Section 3.2 provides a detailed interpretation of the coe¢cients, we merely
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comment here on the mechanisms associated with these e¤ects.
The second e¤ect is related to the threat point of entrepreneurs. A positive interest rate
shock lowers the tightness of the credit market (Rh < 0). As a consequence, entrepreneurs have
access to poor levels of external opportunity, which weakens their threat point, and the credit spread
increases since banks can negotiate a higher interest rate on the loan. The third e¤ect is related to the
average productivity of matches. A positive interest rate shock increases the reservation productivity
(e!Rh > 0), so that the prots from nal production activity are higher and the credit spread increases
since banks get a share (1  ) of these prots.
To conclude this section on the credit spread, it should be noted that in the extreme case of the
banks having no bargaining power ( = 1), the rst and third e¤ects disappear. The credit spread
is in consequence necessarily countercyclical, given the second e¤ect via the response of the credit
market tightness (the condition (57) reduces to Rh < 0). This case is naturally too restrictive to
enable sensible conclusions to be drawn. To this end, we turn to numerical simulation to assess the
plausibility of a countercyclical credit spread.
5.1.2 Numerical Analysis
The model simulation is carried out using the calibration described in Section 4.1 with the additional
constraint Rh = 0:95 for the persistence of interest rate shocks. Figure 3 shows the IRFs produced
by a negative interest rate shock for the following variables: the output, the credit spread, the
credit market tightness, the reservation productivity, the total credit, and the average productivity
of matches. These IRFs are very similar to the IRFs associated with technological shock, which
conrms the results of the previous theoretical analysis.
Negative interest shocks lead to an expansion in the credit market (i.e. the credit variable
increases) that results from two mechanisms, namely a fall in the rate of match destruction (i.e. the
reservation productivity variable decreases) and a rise in the matching probability of entrepreneurs
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(i.e. the credit market tightness variable increases). This credit market expansion leads to an
expansion in output that gradually di¤uses. The IRFs of the total credit and output variables are
hump-shaped. Since the aggregate technology z is constant in this case, the average productivity of
matches (previously denoted !t ) depends only on the reservation productivity and reacts negatively
to negative interest rate shocks.
The credit spread reacts negatively to interest shock, which implies that Rp
Rh
< 0. In a similar
way to technological shocks, the sign of the IRF of the credit spread is the opposite of the sign of
the outputs IRF for all horizons. Because the rst e¤ect of interest shocks induces a procyclical
credit interest spread, this countercyclical property results from the fact that the two other e¤ects
dominate the rst. We perform a sensitivity analysis, for a range of parameter values identical
to these of Section 4.2.2. We do not observe any cases of procyclical credit interest spread25. We
therefore conclude that this model generates a robust countercyclical credit spread in response to
both technological and interest rate shocks.
5.2 The Financial Accelerator
As dened by Bernanke et al. (1996), the nancial accelerator refers to the amplication of initial
shocks brought about by changes in conditions in the credit market. Ever since Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), the agency-based view of the credit market has been by far the most popular approach used
to describe the role of the nancial accelerator. Under such reasoning, the nancial accelerator arises
from variations in agents net worth, which is directly related to cyclical movements in cash ow.
Our model uses an alternative approach based on matching friction, originally developed by Den
Haan et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004). Given the particular nature of our model, it is
useful to document how matching frictions on the credit market amplify and propagate the e¤ects
of shocks in the economy.
25Corresponding gures are available upon request.
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In order to explain the nancial accelerator mechanism, we introduce a wedge between output
Yt and the exogenous aggregate productivity zt, to represent a measure of the nancial accelerator.
Using equation (28). We dene this wedge t as follows
log (t) = log

Yt
zt

= log (nt) + log

! + e!t
2

(58)
the RHS of which is simply the sum of the log-deviations of the mass of nanced entrepreneurs and
the reservation productivity, i.e. bt = bnt + be!t. As a result of technological shock in zt, t measures
the outputs response that is not directly attributable to the shock, but rather to friction in the credit
market. As a result of interest shocks in Rht , with zt = z, this wedge corresponds to the outputs
response, which is entirely attributable to credit market friction.
In response to an expansionary shock (that is bzt > 0 or bRht < 0), the mass of nanced entre-
preneurs increases, while the reservation productivity falls26. As a consequence, the two variables
have di¤erent implications for the nancial accelerator, which may be associated with two di¤erent
mechanisms. The rst is based on the rate of nanced entrepreneurs in the economy and the sec-
ond is linked, without being equivalent, to the reservation productivity. It is noteworthy that the
uctuations in nt result partially from the uctuations in e!t: The e¤ect of e!t on t in equation (58),
i.e. the second mechanism, does not correspond to the full e¤ect of this variable, but only to its
e¤ect through the average idiosyncratic productivity of matches (excluding its e¤ects on the mass of
nanced entrepreneurs):
The mechanism related to the average idiosyncratic productivity of matches weakens the -
nancial accelerator. In response to an expansionary shock (i.e. bzt > 0 or bRht < 0), banks and
entrepreneurs are willing to accept matches with lower idiosyncratic productivity. This fall in the
average idiosyncratic productivity of matches decreases the amplitude of the outputs response to
26The cyclical behavior of nt and e!t are described in the Sections 4.2 and 5.1.
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shocks, hence weakening the nancial accelerator.
The mechanism related to the rate of nanced entrepreneurs reinforces the nancial accelerator,
by amplifying and propagating the e¤ects of shocks. In response to an expansionary shock (i.e. bzt > 0
or bRht < 0), because banks agree to enter the credit market with a lower probability of matching, the
relative supply of loans grows in the economy (i.e. the credit market tightness increases). In addition,
as explained above, since banks and entrepreneurs are more willing to accept matches with a lower
idiosyncratic productivity (i.e. the reservation productivity decreases), the match destruction rate
decreases. As a result of these two e¤ects, matching friction amplies the e¤ects of shocks on the
economy as a result of changes in the rate of nancing of entrepreneurs.
This relationship has interesting dynamic properties. Figures 1 and 3 show that the IRFs of
the reservation productivity decreases monotonically, whereas the IRFs of the rate of nancing for
entrepreneurs is hump-shaped. These Figures also show that the responses of nt are larger than those
of e!t. Hence, the amplication and propagation mechanisms associated with the rate of nancing of
entrepreneurs strongly dominate the stabilization mechanism associated with the e¤ect due to the
average idiosyncratic productivity of matches. Figure 4 makes this point explicitly by plotting the
IRFs of t for identical (symmetric) shocks on the aggregate technology zt and on the interest rate
Rht .
Both shocks are propagated in a similar way, with a growing value of t during the ve quarters
following the shock. It may be seen that the responses of t remain above their initial values for
some time (more than twenty quarters): The amplication is stronger for the technological shock
than for the interest rate shock. In response to a 1% improvement in the aggregate technology zt,
the instantaneous response of t is about 43% and reaches a maximum of 89% after ve quarters.
The amplication e¤ect of the interest rate shock is not as strong, but still signicant. In response
to a 1% cut in the interest rate Rht , the instantaneous response of t is about 11% and reaches a
maximum of 23% after ve quarters. Clearly, with matching friction on the credit market, small
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shocks induce large and persistent uctuations in the economy.
6 Conclusion
This study was motivated by evidence of the countercyclical behavior of the credit spread. We have
explored the consequences of matching friction in the credit market in order to explain this evidence.
To this end, we departed from the traditional view on agency costs and instead followed den Haan
et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004), who developed models of the credit market based on
matching friction. We have proposed an original model with Nash bargaining on the credit interest
rate, entry decisions of banks on the credit market, and separation decisions between banks and
entrepreneurs.
Although some of the e¤ects of technological or interest rate shocks induce a procyclical credit
spread, additional e¤ects associated with the responses of endogenous variables (namely credit market
tightness and reservation productivity) lead to countercyclical behavior. The model simulations
suggest that the latter e¤ects dominate the former, implying a robust countercyclical credit spread.
We also discussed the properties of the nancial accelerator in our model, and conrmed the
conclusion of den Haan et al. (2003) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) that matching friction in the
credit market induces a powerful persistence mechanism in the economy. Persistence is a long-
standing puzzle in macroeconomics, which is of concern both in the literature on business cycles and
on monetary policy. The key issue in this literature is to understand the delay in the reaction to
shocks of endogenous variables such as output in Cogley and Nason (1995), or loan, in Bernanke and
Blinder (1992). An interesting feature of our model is its ability to generate a strong persistence in
these variables merely with credit market friction in the economy, without considering any additional
mechanisms.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition
In order to prove Proposition 1, we rst dene the function  (e!; ) that gives  as a function of
e! and a set of structural parameters  = f; ; z;m; !; !g
 (e!; ) =  (1  ) zm2 (!   !) d (!   e!)2
1=(1 )
(A.1)
This function is obtained from the steadystate expression of (31). The limit values for  are
lim
e!!!
 (e!; ) =  (e!; )je!!! =  (1  ) zm2 (!   !) d 2
1=(1 )
> 0
lim
e!!!
 (e!; ) = 0
If e! 2 ]!; ![ exists and is unique, the Equation (A.1) implies that  exists, is unique, and satises
 2
i
0;  (e!; )je!!!h. In order to establish the existence and uniqueness of e!, we introduce the
steadystate expression of Equation (32) into Equation (A.1) and deduce that e! 2 ]!; ![ is the
solution of
T (e!; !) = 0 (A.2)
where ! =
 
xb; xe; a; Rh; `; z; ;m; d; ; !; !

is a set of structural parameters and the function
T (e!; !) is
T (e!; !) = xb + xe +  1 +Rhz    (!   e!)22 (!   !)   e! (A.3)
+m

(1  ) zm
d
=(1 )

2
1=(1 )
(!   e!)2=(1 )
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In order to nd the solution for Equation (A.2), we rst note that T (e!; !) is strictly decreasing
with respect to e!. The rst order derivative of T (e!; ) with respect to e! is
T1 (e!; ) =   1   !   e!
!   !

 

(1  ) zm
d
=(1 )
m


2 (!   !)
1=(1 )
2
1  
(!   e!) 1+1 
since 

! e!
! !

< 1, the two terms of the derivative are negative and T1 (e!; ) < 0. Hence, the exis-
tence and uniqueness of the equilibrium value e! requires that lime!!! T (e!; ) > 0 and lime!!! T (e!; ) <
0. The deduction of (33) is then straightforward given the two following expressions of the limits of
the function T (e!; )
lim
e!!!
T (e!; ) = xb + xe + a+  1 +Rh
z
  !
+

(1  ) zm
d
=(1 )
m

 (!   !)
2
1=(1 )
+

2  
2


lim
e!!!
T (e!; ) = xb + xe + a+  1 +Rh
z
  !
A.2 Proof of the Proposition
In order to prove Proposition 2, we solve the recursive equilibrium of the credit market tightness.
Introducing Equation (35) into Equation (34) gives
(1  )bt = Et! + e!
!   e!bzt+1 + 2d=z!   e!

1  
m
  

bt+1
The current log-deviation of the credit market tightness depends on the expected values at the next
period for the technological shock and the credit market tightness. Given the autoregressive process
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for zt dened in (30) and assuming Et f"t+1g = 0, we obtain
bt = 2d
z (!   e!)

1
m
 

1  

Et
nbt+1o+ ! + e!
!   e!


1  
bzt
This is a standard intertemporal equation for bt that can be solved by iterating over the future
period. Let us simplify the equation as follows
bt = aEt nbt+1o+ bbzt
The assumption jaj < 1 is su¢cient to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium:We then deduce the
value of the coe¢cient z that satises
bt = z  bzt = b
1  a
 bzt
For jaj < 1; the condition (1  a) > 0 is always satised and since b > 0, we conclude that z > 0.
The explicit expression of z is
z =


1  

! + e!
!   e!

1
1  2d
z(! e!)

1
m
  
1 


:
For the reservation productivity, we assume be!t = e!zzt and deduce from (35) the following
expression for e!z
e!z =   1
m
 

1  

(1  ) d
ze! z   1
The case of e!z < 0 requires
 

1
m
 

1  

(1  ) d
ze! z < 1
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since z > 0, a su¢cient but not necessary condition of e!z < 0 is
1
m
>

1  
:
A.3 Proof of the Proposition
This section describes the model analysis under interest rate shocks. We rst dene the reduced
model, and then its log-linear version.
Condition (41) still ensures the stability of the model. In order to obtain the values of the
elasticities, we introduce Equation (51) into Equation (50)
(1  )bt = Et  2
z (!   e!)Rh bRht+1 + 2d=z(!   e!)

1  
m
  

bt+1
The current log-deviation of the credit market tightness depends on the expected values of interest
rate shock and credit market tightness at the next period. Given the autoregressive process for Rht
dened in (49) and assuming Et

"Rh;t+1
	
= 0, we obtain
bt = 2d
z (!   e!)

1
m
 

1  

Et
nbt+1o  2Rh
z (!   e!)

Rh
1  
 bRht
This is a standard intertemporal equation for bt that can be solved by iterating over the next period,
as for the technological shock. We simplify the equation as follows:
bt = aEt nbt+1o+ bbzt
The assumption jaj < 1 is su¢cient to guarantee the stability of the equilibrium: The solution for
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Rh such that bt = Rh  bRht = b1  aRh  bRht
For jaj < 1; the condition 1  a > 0 is always satised and since b < 0, Rh < 0.
Rh =  
2Rh
z (!   e!)

Rh
1  

1 
2d=z
(!   e!)

1
m
 

1  

 1
< 0
For the reservation productivity, we impose be!t = e!Rh bRht and deduce from (51) the following
expression for e!Rh
ze!e!Rh = Rh    1m    1  

(1  ) dRh
since Rh < 0; the condition (42) here implies that e!Rh > 0.
Finally, for the credit spread, we obtain
RpRp
Rh
=   (1  )Rh + (1  )
z
2
e!Rh   dRh
Given Rh > 0 and R
h > 0; condition (42) is su¢cient to ensure Rp
Rh
> 0; because this condition
implies e!Rh < 0:
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List of Figures
Figure 1. Impulse Response Functions (IRFs) of the output, the credit spread, the total credit, the
credit market tightness, the reservation productivity, and the average productivity of matches
to a positive technological shock.
Figure 2. The coe¢cients of correlation of output with the credit spread for various values of the
parameters  and  and of the variable p.
Figure 3. IRFs of the output, the credit spread, the total credit, the credit market tightness, the
reservation productivity, and the average productivity of matches to a negative interest rate
shock.
Figure 4. IRFs of the nancial accelerator wedge t to both shocks and shock dynamics.
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